Publications & Working Papers

Abstract: Amid rising political polarization, derogatory rhetoric targeting social groups has become common and highly contested across party lines. These partisan divides are often attributed to disagreement about whether bias has occurred, and theories of social norms, harm-based moral judgment, and cognitive consistency suggest that recognizing bias should track moral condemnation. Yet other theories suggest that recognition and condemnation are psychologically distinct. We propose that, even when partisans similarly recognize explicit bias (“yeah, it’s biased”), they may diverge in moral response (“but…”)—depending on the target’s advantaged or disadvantaged status. Across six pre-studies (N = 1,197), eight preregistered experiments (N = 7,145), and 16 supplemental studies, including two preregistered experiments (N = 1,029), we examined this “yeah, but” phenomenon. For speech that partisans equivalently recognized as biased based on race and gender, Democrats condemned bias against disadvantaged targets more than Republicans; Republicans condemned bias against advantaged targets more than Democrats—patterns that extended to endorsing sanctions (Study 1). Partisans invoked the same justifications—invulnerability to harm and honesty—but selectively so, depending on the target (Study 2). These patterns emerged for biases based on socioeconomic status and religion (Studies 3–4), behaviors (Study 5), and partisanship (which lacks a stable status hierarchy; Study 6). However, a status-juxtaposition intervention (judging bias against both advantaged and disadvantaged groups) narrowed Democrats’ within-party asymmetry (Studies 7a–b). By disentangling bias recognition from bias condemnation, we show that moral polarization may persist even when Democrats and Republicans both “see” bias and invoke the same moral concerns.

Abstract: While many social biases are considered taboo, bias against political outgroups is increasingly explicit, ubiquitous, and tolerated. We contend that expressing political bias can reduce third-party perceptions of socially unacceptable biases—a phenomenon we call political plausible deniability. By diverting attributions away from biases based on race, gender, or sexual orientation, individuals can express bias yet ostensibly align with social norms. Pretests indicate people intuitively understand the concept of a socially acceptable bias, with political bias rated most acceptable among 15 biases. Across 13 preregistered survey experiments, we find that third parties are less likely to perceive racism, sexism, and (sometimes) heterosexism when an actor expresses an antiliberal statement toward a Black, female, or gay target. These effects emerge across open-ended (Studies 1a–c) and Likert-type (Studies 2a–c, 3a–c, 4a–c) responses, which we replicate in a conjoint experiment (Study 5). Participants’ political leanings did not moderate effects. Finally, in 12 exploratory studies, we further illuminate political plausible deniability, for example, by examining anticonservative biases, comparing political with other (nonpolitical) biases, and exploring the role of intersecting target identities. Our research exposes an inconspicuous way that political bias may shape social perception, with implications for understanding how prejudice operates in everyday life.

Abstract: Political language can serve as a powerful tool for mobilizing and uniting voters. The present work examines partisan differences in the use of interdependent language—language that emphasizes connection, collective goals, and cooperation—in US Congressional campaign emails during the 2024 general election. Using computerized text analysis (LIWC), we analyze over 15,000 emails from 378 Senate and House candidates to assess the prevalence of interdependent language, as measured by first-person plural pronouns, references to affiliation, and social language. Our findings suggest that, on average, Democratic candidates employ significantly more interdependent language than their Republican counterparts. However, we observe pronounced shifts in this pattern over time, with Republicans’ use of interdependent language increasing to match Democrats as Election Day approaches. Given prior evidence that framing issues in interdependent terms can foster cooperation and collective action, understanding how political candidates engage with the language of interdependence can provide insight into the rhetorical tools used to rally support and motivate political engagement.

Abstract: A representative democracy requires citizens to be politically engaged; however, a substantial portion of eligible United States voters do not vote. While structural (e.g., ease or difficulty of voting) and individual (e.g., political efficacy, civic knowledge) factors contribute to (a lack of) turnout, the present work adopts a sociocultural perspective to investigate an additional contributor: how people construe—or make sense of—the duty to vote. We examine whether, and for whom, construing voting as interdependent (i.e., voting as a duty to others), compared to independent (i.e., voting as a duty to self), is associated with increased perceived duty and political engagement. Archival analysis (n = 10,185) documents how perceived duty to vote relates to voter turnout in a nationally representative sample of Americans (Study 1). Two preregistered studies (total n = 1,256) provide evidence that naturalistically construing one’s duty to vote as interdependent (Study 2) and experimentally reflecting on interdependence (Study 3) both predict increases in perceived voting duty. Perceived duty to vote, in turn, is associated with heightened political engagement intentions. Taken together, the present work suggests that how voting is construed—as an independent duty to the self or an interdependent duty to others—may meaningfully influence political engagement, with implications for voter turnout interventions.

Press: Princeton Research Record, Newswise, iNews

Abstract: Contemporary debates about addressing inequality require a common, accurate understanding of the scope of the issue at hand. Yet little is known about who notices inequality in the world around them and when. Across five studies (N = 8,779) employing various paradigms, we consider the role of ideological beliefs about the desirability of social equality in shaping individuals’ attention to—and accuracy in detecting—inequality across the class, gender, and racial domains. In Study 1, individuals higher (versus lower) on social egalitarianism were more likely to naturalistically remark on inequality when shown photographs of urban scenes. In Study 2, social egalitarians were more accurate at differentiating between equal versus unequal distributions of resources between men and women on a basic cognitive task. In Study 3, social egalitarians were faster to notice inequality-relevant changes in images in a change detection paradigm indexing basic attentional processes. In Studies 4 and 5, we varied whether unequal treatment adversely affected groups at the top or bottom of society. In Study 4, social egalitarians were, on an incentivized task, more accurate at detecting inequality in speaking time in a panel discussion that disadvantaged women but not when inequality disadvantaged men. In Study 5, social egalitarians were more likely to naturalistically point out bias in a pattern detection hiring task when the employer was biased against minorities but not when majority group members faced equivalent bias. Our results reveal the nuances in how our ideological beliefs shape whether we accurately notice inequality, with implications for prospects for addressing it. 

Press: Kellogg Insight, Ars Technica, LSE News

Abstract: This research examines the relationship between one's theory of a good life and allostatic load, a marker of cumulative biological risk, and how this relationship differs by socioeconomic status. Among adults with a bachelor's degree or higher, those who saw individual characteristics (e.g. personal happiness, effort) as part of a good life had lower levels of allostatic load than those who did not. In contrast, among adults with less than a bachelor's degree, those who saw supportive relationships as part of a good life had lower levels of allostatic load than those who did not. These findings extend past research on socioeconomic differences in the emphasis on individual or relational factors and suggest that one's theory of a good life has health implications. 

Abstract: A central puzzle in the social sciences is that, despite high and rising inequality, democracies consistently under-deliver redistributive policies. Research in economics and political science has documented one explanation for this puzzle: beliefs about the extent of inequality are polarized along ideological lines, with liberals believing there to be more inequality than conservatives. We decompose this ideological divide in inequality perceptions into two sources: the decision threshold applied by liberals and conservatives when classifying possible instances of inequality ('criterion') and their tendency to perceive inequality to begin with ('sensitivity'). Across five studies (N = 1,962), we find that liberals consistently report seeing more inequality than conservatives when exposed to identical stimuli. A formal signal detection decomposition reveals that the effect size of the difference in criterion between liberals and conservatives is nearly twice the magnitude of the sensitivity difference. The ideological gap in perceived inequality disappears when stimuli depict inequality unambiguously-that is, when the signal is strong enough to clear even the strictest decision thresholds. Notably, we find that perceived inequality is associated with fairness concerns and support for redistributive policies above and beyond ideological orientation. These findings suggest that the everyday settings in which people encounter instances of social inequality are themselves likely to produce consequential differences in beliefs about the extent of inequality.

Abstract: Organizations use performance evaluation systems to motivate desired behaviors, yet the structure of these systems can suppress collectively beneficial actions. When individuals face concrete evaluative costs for failed attempts, they may avoid uncertain actions that improve team outcomes but expose them to personal risk-even when incentives are aligned and the expected value of the attempt is positive. We study this dynamic using a natural experiment in the National Basketball Association (NBA). Beginning in the 2025-2026 season, late-quarter, long-distance shots ("heaves") were excluded from individual shooting percentages. Notably, the reform applied only to heaves attempted in the first three quarters, while fourth-quarter heaves remained subject to the prior recording convention. We use a within-player differencein-differences design that compares the post-reform change in Q1-Q3 heaves to the post-reform change in Q4 heaves, finding that the recording reform led to a doubling in heave attempts. This effect was largest among players with higher three-point shooting percentages-those for whom a missed heave imposed the greatest evaluative cost under the prior system. We further document that players attempt fewer heaves in contract years and that teams attempt more heaves when trailing or facing elimination. Together, these findings demonstrate that performance evaluation systems can suppress team-benefiting actions by concentrating the costs of failure in salient individual metrics. Redesigning evaluation rules, rather than increasing rewards for success, may be more effective for encouraging cooperation and experimentation in organizations.

Abstract: Three preregistered studies of Americans (total N = 4,475) use a novel typology of 440 economic policies to isolate four motives: helping the poor, helping the rich, reducing inequality, and increasing efficiency. Results reveal notable cross-party consistency: both Democrats and Republicans prioritize helping the poor above all else and favor reducing over increasing inequality. Yet partisans differ in managing trade-offs when priorities conflict: Democrats sacrifice help to the poor to constrain rising inequality; Republicans are reluctant to harm the wealthy even when inequality is reduced. Study 2 replicates these results and validates the typology against real-world policy support. Despite substantial overlap, Study 3 reveals that partisans (especially Democrats) misperceive outgroup priorities. Specifically, Democrats predict that Republicans favor helping the rich and increasing inequality, while Republicans' actual priorities closely resemble their own. By creating separate dimensions, our typology isolates economic motives and highlights areas of bipartisan agreement on fundamental economic priorities.